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Abstract We present two experiments that probe so-called variation effects of
modified numerals that appear in the scope of a universal quantifier (Geurts &
Nouwen 2007; Büring 2008). For example, Every street was guarded by at least
three policemen suggests that not every street was guarded by the same number of
policemen. This kind of variation is similar to inferences observed with epistemic
indefinites. We show, however, that indefinites and modified numerals must differ
with respect to the underlying mechanism, or, more specifically, with respect to the
structure of the set of alternatives that determines the pragmatic inferences. Results
from our experiments indicate that the variation effects of modified numerals include
the inference of a witness for the lowest number compatible with the modified
numeral. We found the same effects for at least as for more than, but the inferences
are weaker for the latter.
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1 Introduction
Modified numerals provide a rich area of research for a great variety of implicature-
like inferences, ranging from standard scalar implicatures and their obviation (Fox
& Hackl 2006; Mayr 2013; Schwarz 2013) to ignorance implicatures (Geurts &
Nouwen 2007; Büring 2008; Nouwen 2010; McNabb & Penka 2015) and free choice
effects (Geurts & Nouwen 2007; Büring 2008; Nouwen 2015). The fact that modified
numerals give rise to inferences beyond the standard scalar ones has been formulated
in a number of analyses that, at some level of description, offer a parallel between
numeral modifiers and disjunction (Büring 2008; Cummins & Katsos 2010; Schwarz
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2013; Coppock & Brochhagen 2013; Nouwen 2015; Kennedy 2015). The leading
intuition behind such a comparison comes from pairs like (1)-(2) and (3)-(4). In the
same way that a simple unembedded disjunction like (1) gives rise to an epistemic
reading, (2) is likewise interpreted as conveying that the speaker does not have
knowledge of the exact number of pieces of fruit John ate.
(1) John ate an apple or a banana. IGNORANCE
(2) John ate at least two pieces of fruit. IGNORANCE
This ignorance effect can disappear in embedded constructions: (3) has a reading
that lacks an ignorance implicature, as it can be used even when the speaker knows
which fruit each one of the boys ate, as long as some boys ate an apple and some
boys ate a banana, and nothing else was eaten by the boys. Similarly, (4) has an
interpretation that lacks an ignorance implicature, where the speaker knows precisely
how many pieces of fruit each boy ate, as long as no boy ate fewer than two pieces
of fruit.
(3) Every boy ate an apple or a banana.
(4) Every boy ate at least two pieces of fruit.
Epistemic indefinites show a similar contrast (see e.g., Alonso-Ovalle & Menéndez-
Benito 2015): while (5) has an obligatory ignorance effect, this effect is optional in
an embedded position (6).
(5) Irgendein
IRGEND-one
Student
student
hat
has
angerufen.
called
(German)
‘Some (non-specific) student called.’
(6) Jede
Each
Studentin
student
hat
has
irgendein
IRGEND-one
Buch
book
gelesen
read
‘Each (female) student read some (non-specific) book.’
That said, the examples (3), (4) and (6) are not free of additional pragmatic in-
ferences. While potentially lacking the ignorance implicature, they give rise to a
variation effect. For example, (3) is infelicitous in a situation in which every boy ate
the same kind of fruit; that is, if every boy ate an apple or every boy ate a banana.
Similar effects can be observed with modified numerals and epistemic indefinites:
unless they are read with an ignorance inference, (4) implies that not every boy ate
the same number of fruits and (6) implies that not every female student read the
same book.
In this paper we discuss two experiments that (i) probe the existence of variation
effects with modified numerals, and (ii) study what mechanisms can be said to be
responsible for such effects. In our assessment, we will try to abstract away from
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specific frameworks (classical, Hamblin, inquisitive). Instead, we focus on one
particular aspect of the pragmatic mechanisms involved in all these frameworks,
namely the particular set of alternatives that is assumed to be responsible for the
occurring inferences. The next section reviews the strategies that could potentially
be responsible for variation in (3), (4) and (6). Section 3 summarises experiments
targeting the variation effects. Section 4 concludes.
2 Three strategies yielding variation
In what follows we assume a very basic recipe for implicature calculation: given
an assertion a and a set of alternatives to that assertion A, a implicates the denial
of each of the alternatives in A. The inference from (3) that not everyone ate an
apple and not everyone ate a banana, follows straightforwardly from this mechanism
once we adopt the assumption that the individual disjuncts are alternatives to the
disjunction itself (shown schematically in (7)).
(7)
Assertion Alternatives Implicatures
∀x[ax∨bx] ∀x[ax] ¬∀x[ax]
∀x[bx] ¬∀x[bx]
∀x[ax∧bx] ¬∀x[ax∧bx]
It follows that:
∃x[ax]
∃x[bx]
The exact choice of the alternatives plays a more crucial role once we turn to more
than two disjuncts. We distinguish two strategies:
(8) Strategy 1: the alternatives of a disjunction are the disjuncts themselves,
closed under disjunction and conjunction
(9) Strategy 2: the alternatives of a disjunction are only the atomic disjunctions
themselves
The rich set of alternatives in Strategy 1 corresponds to a Katzir-style theory of
alternatives (Katzir 2008). Strategy 2 offers a much poorer set, one in which the
implicature mechanism involves comparison to only those alternatives that are fully
specific. For ternary disjunction, the two strategies produce different results, as
shown in (10) and (11). For ease of exposition (10) only contains a relevant (and
sufficient) subset of the full set of potential alternatives.
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(10) Strategy 1
Assertion Alternatives Implicatures
∀x[ax∨bx∨ cx] ∀x[ax] ¬∀x[ax]
∀x[bx] ¬∀x[bx]
∀x[cx] ¬∀x[cx]
∀x[ax∨bx] ¬∀x[ax∨bx]
∀x[ax∨ cx] ¬∀x[ax∨ cx]
∀x[bx∨ cx] ¬∀x[bx∨ cx]
It follows that:
∃x[ax]
∃x[bx]
∃x[cx]
(total variation)
(11) Strategy 2
Assertion Alternatives Implicatures
∀x[ax∨bx∨ cx] ∀x[ax] ¬∀x[ax]
∀x[bx] ¬∀x[bx]
∀x[cx] ¬∀x[cx]
It follows that:
∃x[ax∨bx]
∃x[bx∨ cx]
∃x[ax∨ cx]
(partial variation)
The two strategies give rise to a different interpretative effect. While both yield a
variation effect, the effect of Strategy 1 is a much stronger one than the effect of
Strategy 2. While the former says that every disjunct has to be true for at least one x,
the latter only requires this to be the case for at least two of the disjuncts. For ternary
disjunction, only Strategy 1 is suitable. A sentence like (12) is infelicitous in case
(for instance) no boy ate a plum.
(12) Every boy ate an apple, a banana or a plum.
Given the logical parallel between indefinites and disjunction, one might want to posit
a parallel implicature mechanism for variation effects with (epistemic) indefinites.
However, indefinites like the Spanish algún seem to require Strategy 2. Consider
(13), which illustrates this point using universal modals (from Alonso-Ovalle &
Menéndez-Benito 2010: p. 6):
(13) Juan
Juan
tiene
has
que
to
estar
be
en
in
alguna
alguna
habitación
room
de
of
la
the
casa.
house
‘Juan must be in some (non-specific) room in the house.’
The sentence conveys that there is partial variation: Juan might be in one room
or another. The strong variation requirement, that all the rooms are epistemic
possibilities, is not part of the interpretation of (13) according to Alonso-Ovalle &
Menéndez-Benito (2010).
Like indefinites, modified numerals have an intrinsically disjunctive logical
structure, too. In fact, the comparison between superlative modified numerals and
disjunction has recently been quite popular (Büring 2008; Cummins & Katsos 2010;
Coppock & Brochhagen 2013; Kennedy 2015; Nouwen 2015).
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A quantifier like at least 10 could be seen to convey a disjunctive choice of values:
x = 10∨ x = 11∨ x = 12∨ . . . . But as was the case with algún, it is evident that
modified numerals display partial rather than total variation in universally quantified
contexts (cf. Schwarz 2013). When not read with an ignorance implicature, the
sentence in (14) conveys that not everyone ate the same number of tacos and it
clearly lacks the total variation implication, such that for every number exceeding 9,
there is someone who ate that many tacos.
(14) Everyone ate at least 10 tacos.
We can thus already conclude that Strategy 2 fares better than Strategy 1 in the case
of modified numerals:
(15) Strategy 2
Assertion Alternatives Implicatures
∀x[ fx ≥ 10] ∀x[ fx = 10] ¬∀x[ fx = 10]
∀x[ fx = 11] ¬∀x[ fx = 11]
∀x[ fx = 12] ¬∀x[ fx = 12]
. . . etc. . . . etc.
It follows that:
¬∃n∀x[ fx = n]
(partial variation)
Although the details of implementation are rather different, this is essentially a
strategy that would fit naturally in the inquisitive semantics proposal of Coppock &
Brochhagen (2013) or the anti-specificity proposal of Nouwen (2015).1 Importantly,
Strategy 2 is not the only route to an account of partial variation. Rather than viewing
a quantifier like at least 10 as an infinite disjunction of values, it is often assumed
that at least 10 is (at some level of description) parallel to the binary disjunction
exactly 10 or more (Büring 2008; Cummins & Katsos 2010; Kennedy 2015). Let’s
call this Strategy 3:
(16) Strategy 3
Assertion Alternatives Implicatures
∀x[ fx ≥ 10] ∀x[ fx = 10] ¬∀x[ fx = 10]
∀x[ fx > 10] ¬∀x[ fx = 10]
It follows that:
∃x[ fx = 10]
∃x[ fx > 10]
(partial variation)
Strategy 3 shares with Strategy 2 the implication of partial variation, but it is stronger
in the sense that it additionally requires there to be a witness for the value 10.
So, while with Strategy 3 it follows from (14) that someone ate 10 tacos (and that
someone ate more), with Strategy 2 it merely follows from (14) that not everyone
ate the same number of tacos.
1 More precisely, Nouwen (2015) discusses the potential empirical shortcomings of such a proposal as
well as ways to circumvent these.
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We now turn to the experiments that target variation effects and can thus po-
tentially distinguish between the two strategies that are commonly considered,
Strategy 2 and Strategy 3.
3 Experiments
We discuss two experiments conducted in Dutch that address two separate goals: (i)
to what extent do modified numerals display variation effects? (Experiment 1); (ii)
what strategy is involved in the variation effects? (Experiment 2). Both experiments
involve a felicity judgement task. Participants were presented with claims made by a
researcher, followed by a question posed by someone interviewing the researcher.
The participants were asked to judge to what extent the question made sense given
the statement just made.
Here are two illustrations of this task:
(17) Researcher: Some of the samples were contaminated.
Interviewer: Were all of the samples contaminated?
Does the interviewer’s question make sense?
(18) Researcher: Some of the samples were contaminated.
Interviewer: How did you find out that not all of the samples were contami-
nated?
Does the interviewer’s question make sense?
Participants could indicate to which extent they thought the question made sense
in light of the claim just made by selecting a score on a Likert scale. The idea was
that if a participant assumes that the interviewer will calculate an implicature in the
researcher’s claim (that not all of the samples were contaminated), then s/he will
judge the interviewer’s question in (17) as relatively infelicitous, since the participant
is assuming that the interviewer already knows the answer to the question s/he is
posing. Reversely, in (18), calculating the implicature will lead to a higher score,
since the question takes for granted that the implicature has indeed been calculated.
In other words, using this method, we can measure the likelihood that a certain
inference is drawn. We used the strategy in (17) in Experiment 1 and the one in (18)
in Experiment 2.
3.1 Experiment 1
3.1.1 Participants
97 people participated in Experiment 1 out of whom only 68 were native speakers of
Dutch who filled in the entire questionnaire (created on www.surveymonkey.com)
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without making any mistakes on the practice items. We used only the data from
these 68 participants (39 female, mean age: 38, age range: 20-68) in subsequent
analyses. All of the participants volunteered in filling in the questionnaire and were
naive as to the purpose of the study.
3.1.2 Design & material
The experimental conditions all involved statements uttered by the researcher with
a modified numeral embedded in the nuclear scope of a universal quantifier. The
interviewer’s question asked about more details regarding the researcher’s statement
in a way that went against the variation effect of the researcher’s statement. For
instance, one of the items had the form in (19).
(19) Example of an experimental item (in the original Dutch):
Onderzoeker: Tijdens het evenement werd elke straat door

meer dan zes
minstens zes
zes of meer

agenten beveiligd.
Interviewer: Werden ze allemaal door evenveel agenten beveiligd?
English version:
Researcher: During the event every street was guarded by

more than six
at least six
six or more

policemen.
Interviewer: Were they all guarded by the same number of policemen?
The use of the researcher-interviewer context served to weaken a potential ignorance
interpretation of the researcher’s statement. The assumption is that a researcher is
most likely to be an authority on her/his own results.
There were two factors in the experiment: (i) the form of the modified numeral:
the comparative form (meer dan n ‘more than n’), the superlative form (minstens
n ‘at least n’) or the disjunctive form (n of meer ‘n or more’), and (ii) the type of
question the interviewer asked, which had two levels. The latter manipulation is not
relevant for the present study, so we will not be discussing it here. Moreover, we
will only be concerned with more than and at least; see Alexandropoulou (2015) for
a discussion of the results regarding n or more.
The experimental task had six target items and six fillers. It also included 13 good
controls and four bad controls (number of stimuli = 29).2 In the good controls, the
2 Given the variation effects, it was expected that experimental items would be judged as bad, so more
good controls were present to offset the asymmetry.
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interviewer asks a relatively neutral follow-up question, which does not contradict
the researcher’s statement; in the bad controls, the interviewer’s question prompts a
proposition that contradicts the given statement. An example of a good and a bad
control is given below.
(20) Example of a good control:
Onderzoeker: Elke boer in Drenthe heeft zes of meer koeien.
Interviewer: Hoe ben je daar achtergekomen?
English version:
Researcher: Every farmer in Drenthe has six or more cows.
Interviewer: How did you find that out?
(21) Example of a bad control:
Onderzoeker: In de binnenstad van Leiden vind je volgens de Michelin-gids
de mooiste grachten.
Interviewer: Waarom heeft Leiden eigenlijk geen grachten?
English version:
Researcher: According to the Michelin guide, the nicest canals are in the
centre of Leiden.
Interviewer: Why are there no canals in Leiden?
Experimental items were rotated through six lists, so that each participant saw each
item only in one experimental condition.
3.1.3 Procedure
Participants were presented with items like (19-21) and were asked to judge how well
the interviewer understood the researcher’s claim. They did so on a –3 to 3 Likert
scale, where –3 is ‘the claim is not understood’ and 3 is ‘the claim is understood’.
Four practice items were provided at the beginning of the questionnaire to familiarise
participants with the task. They had the form of bad and good continuation questions;
that is, two of them were to be rated towards the negative end of the scale and the
other two towards the positive end of the scale. Most participants filled in the
experiment on-line, although some participants completed a pen-and-paper version
of the experiment.
3.1.4 Results and discussion
Part of the obtained data from good control items was not included in the statistical
analysis due to a typo. The rest of the data were analysed with ordered probit models
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using the ordinal package (Christensen 2013) in R. Two different analyses were
conducted: (i) the reference level was MORE THAN, which was compared to the
other numeral modifier conditions as well as to the good and bad controls; (ii) the
reference level was AT LEAST, which was compared to the good and bad controls. In
both analyses, there was one fixed effect: that of the experimental manipulation (five
levels in analysis (i): MORE THAN, AT LEAST, N OR MORE, GOOD CONTROLS, and
BAD CONTROLS, and three levels in analysis (ii): AT LEAST, GOOD CONTROLS,
and BAD CONTROLS). Both models included intercept and slope random effects
for subjects and random intercepts for items, which was the maximal random-effect
structure.
−3
−1
1
3
more than at least bad controls good controls
S
co
re
Figure 1 Experiment 1: boxplots of scores
The boxplot in Figure 1 summarises the scores of each experimental manipula-
tion. In the first analysis, the AT LEAST items received significantly lower scores
than the MORE THAN items (β =−.521, SE = .217, p < .05). Moreover, the MORE
THAN items were rated significantly lower than the GOOD CONTROLS (β =−2.049,
SE = .295, p< .0001) and significantly higher than the BAD CONTROLS (β = 2.434,
SE = .456, p < .0001). The second analysis revealed a similar behaviour for the
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AT LEAST items with respect to the two control conditions. That is, the AT LEAST
items scored significantly lower than the GOOD CONTROLS (β =−2.409, SE = .276,
p< .0001) and significantly higher than the BAD CONTROLS (β = 1.895, SE = .416,
p < .0001).
Recall that the interviewer’s questions in MORE THAN and AT LEAST would
form a plausible follow-up to the researcher’s statement, if they didn’t go against the
variation inference of modified numerals. The fact that MORE THAN and AT LEAST
were judged as significantly worse than the GOOD CONTROLS supports the position
that the modified numerals yield variation effects. At the same time, the stimuli with
the modified numerals were judged as better than the BAD CONTROLS, which may
suggest that the interviewer’s violation of variation effects is not a case of semantic
contradiction. Overall, it is tempting to conclude that variation effects are pragmatic
in nature, given the fact that the scores were significantly different from those of
both good and bad controls. We should note, however, that the modified numeral
items did not form minimal pairs with the controls and, so, there could be other
reasons for the differences we found.
We now turn to the follow-up experiment that further investigates the nature of
variation effects with modified numerals.
3.2 Experiment 2
The results of Experiment 1 provide evidence that modified numerals yield variation
effects. However, the experiment leaves it open whether such effects are due to
Strategy 2 or 3. This issue is addressed in the second experiment.
3.2.1 Participants
38 native speakers of Dutch filled in the on-line experiment (created in Ibex and
hosted on Ibex farm, Drummond 2007). All participants were undergraduate students
at the Faculty of Arts, University of Groningen (most of them first-year students).
They received a course credit for their participation and were naive as to the purpose
of the study.
3.2.2 Design & material
The second experiment tested two types of modified numerals, meer dan n ‘more
than n’ and minstens n ‘at least n’. The modified numerals were tested in six
conditions, detailed below.
In four of the six conditions, modified numerals were embedded under a universal
quantifier, alle ‘all’. In the first two of these four, ALL-LOWEST, the researcher made
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a statement similar to Experiment 1, claiming that for every situation, more than
n−1/at least n entities had a property P. The interviewer’s question then presupposed
that (the researcher just provided evidence that) in some cases, n entities had the
property P, as exemplified in (22).
(22) Example of an experimental item in conditions ALL-LOWEST (Dutch):
Onderzoeker: Tijdens het evenement werden alle straten door
{
meer dan drie
minstens vier
}
agenten beveiligd.
Interviewer: Hoe ben je er achtergekomen dat er een straat met vier agenten
is?
English version:
Researcher: During the event all streets were guarded by
{
more than three
at least four
}
policemen.
Interviewer: How did you find out that there was a street guarded by four
policemen?
The interviewer’s presupposition makes use of the inference triggered by variation
effects. Recall that under Strategy 3, the researcher’s statement in (22) implies that
there was at least one street guarded by four policemen. The inference would license
the presupposition. However, if variation effects were derived through Strategy 2, it
would only follow from the researcher’s statement that not all streets had the same
number of policemen. Hence, the presupposition would not be satisfied and some
extra reasoning would be required to accommodate the felicity of the interviewer’s
question.
The second pair of the first four conditions, ALL-HIGHER, illustrated in (22),
differed only in the number that the interviewer’s question targeted (boldfaced in the
example).
(23) Example of an experimental item in conditions ALL-HIGHER (Dutch):
Onderzoeker: Tijdens het evenement werden alle straten door
{
meer dan drie
minstens vier
}
agenten beveiligd.
Interviewer: Hoe ben je er achtergekomen dat er een straat met vijf agenten
is?
English version:
Researcher: During the event all streets were guarded by
{
more than three
at least four
}
policemen.
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Interviewer: How did you find out that there was a street guarded by five
policemen?
Since neither Strategy 2 nor Strategy 3 derives the inference that there were some
streets guarded by five policemen, the presupposition would have to be accommo-
dated under either strategy.
The last two conditions, SOME, tested modified numerals embedded under
existential quantifiers, as exemplified in (24).
(24) Example of an experimental item in conditions SOME (Dutch):
Onderzoeker: Tijdens het evenement werden enkele straten door
{
meer dan drie
minstens vier
}
agenten beveiligd.
Interviewer: Hoe ben je er achtergekomen dat er geen straat met meer dan
vier agenten was?
English version:
Researcher: During the event some streets were guarded by
{
more than three
at least four
}
policemen.
Interviewer: How did you find out that there was no street guarded by more
than 4 policemen?
In this case, the interviewer’s presupposition should be valid if modified numerals
triggered scalar implicatures on the scale 〈more than n / at least n,more than n+1 /
at least n+1, . . .〉.
Finally, the experiment also tested variation effects with disjunction in one
condition. Since this is not directly relevant for our study, we will not discuss it here.
The experiment consisted of 14 items (having seven conditions). There were an
additional and comparable 14 items (with seven conditions), which tested modified
numerals (and disjunctions) under universal and existential modals (not discussed
here). The experiment also included 10 good controls similar to Experiment 1, and
10 contradictions. Finally, there were 10 fillers. The total number of stimuli was 58.
3.2.3 Procedure
Participants had to judge items on a -3 to 3 Likert scale, where -3 stands for ‘the
claim is not understood’ and 3 stands for ‘the claim is understood’. There were four
practice items at the beginning of the questionnaire, two of which were examples
of bad questions and two of which were examples of good questions. The items
were rotated through seven lists so that each participant saw each item only in one
condition.
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3.2.4 Results and discussion
As in Experiment 1, the data were analysed with ordered probit models using the
ordinal package in R. Two different analyses were considered: (i) conditions
in which modified numerals were either embedded under universal or existential
quantifiers were compared to each other; (ii) the reference level of the first analysis
was compared to good and bad controls. In the first analysis, there were two fixed
effects and their interaction. The effects were: the type of modified numeral (MORE
THAN or AT LEAST, the former being the reference level); the type of embedding
+ question (ALL-LOWEST – modified numerals under ‘all’, the question targets the
lowest possible number, cf. (22), ALL-HIGHER – modified numerals under ‘all’,
the question targets a higher number, cf. (23), SOME – modified numerals under
‘some’; ALL-LOWEST was the reference level). In the second analysis, there was
one fixed effect: that of the experimental manipulation comparing comparatives with
ALL-LOWEST to controls (ALL-LOWEST + MORE THAN vs. GOOD CONTROLS and
BAD CONTROLS). The models included the maximal random effect structure for
subjects and items.
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
all−lowest all−higher some controls
−3
−1
1
3
more than at least more than at least more than at least bad good
Sc
or
e
Figure 2 Experiment 2: boxplots of scores
In the first analysis, we found two significant main effects: ALL-HIGHER and
SOME were rated as worse than ALL-LOWEST (β =−.603,SE = .234, p = .01 and
β = −1.765,SE = .338, p < .0001, respectively). In the second analysis, GOOD
CONTROLS were judged as better than ALL-LOWEST + MORE THAN, while BAD
CONTROLS were judged as worse (β = −1.637,SE = .303, p < .0001 and β =
−2.031,SE = .343, p < .0001, respectively). Boxplots of our data are provided in
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Figure 2.
The significant difference between ALL-HIGHER and ALL-LOWEST in the ex-
pected direction shows that the interviewer’s question made more sense when it
targeted the lowest possible number compatible with the researcher’s statement.
This result is not accounted for by Strategy 2, which predicts that readers should
accommodate questions in ALL-LOWEST and ALL-HIGHER in equal measures and
therefore not distinguish between these two conditions. In contrast, Strategy 3
predicts this difference, since the presupposition of the interviewer’s question in
ALL-LOWEST follows from variation effects and does not need to be accommodated,
unlike in ALL-HIGHER. Proponents of Strategy 2 would thus have to argue that
the observed difference has an alternative source to the one just mentioned. We
are not sure what such an alternative could be. We are not aware of evidence that
statements about lower numbers are easier to accommodate than statements about
higher numbers. Notice also that one cannot simply state that the interviewer repeats
the same number as the reviewer in ALL-LOWEST and this repetition explains the
observed finding. This explanation would work for the AT LEAST items, but it would
fail to explain our data in the MORE THAN condition, since there the interviewer
never repeats the number that the researcher used.
While we believe that our results support Strategy 3, they are problematic for
the actual proposals adopting Strategy 3 (Büring 2008; Cummins & Katsos 2010;
Kennedy 2015). This is because those proposals assume the variation effects only
for at least. But this is clearly incorrect: we observe the difference ALL-LOWEST vs.
ALL-HIGHER irrespective of the type of modified numeral.
The degraded status of SOME compared to ALL-LOWEST strongly suggests that
while variation effects are available with modified numerals, scalar implicatures are
not. This is in line with previous observations (e.g., Krifka 1999). Finally, as in
Experiment 1, we also see that our items with modified numerals are worse than
good controls and better than bad controls, suggesting that variation effects are
available (hence, ALL-LOWEST is judged as better than bad controls), but they are
not as readily available as neutral follow-up questions (good controls). The latter
fact might be interpreted as evidence that some extra work (pragmatic inference) is
needed for their derivation.
There was another finding in Experiment 1, which we did not mention so far:
minstens ‘at least’ was judged as worse than meer dan ‘more than’ when variation
was suspended. In the current experiment, this should translate into AT LEAST being
judged as better than MORE THAN in the ALL-LOWEST condition. We observe this
tendency, as can be seen in the boxplot of Figure 2. However, the tendency does
not reach significance. One possibility for this discrepancy between the current
and previous experiments might be due to lack of power: we only had 38 subjects
in Experiment 2, compared to 68 subjects in Experiment 1. But if the numerical
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tendency is to be trusted, we see again that variation effects are more strongly tied to
modified numerals of the ‘at least’ type than to the ‘more than’ type. The varying
strength of inference is presumably to blame for why previous literature considered
only superlative modified numerals like ‘at least’ when discussing variation effects.
4 Conclusions
As anticipated in a great deal of the theoretical literature on modified numerals, our
experiments show that at least triggers variation effects. A more surprising result
from our experiment (but one anticipated in Mayr 2013) is that comparative modified
numerals (more than n) display the same effects, albeit in a somewhat weaker form.
The variation effects were significantly different from both good and bad controls,
which may suggest that they are not semantic in nature. It is tempting to conclude
from these studies that these inferences are implicatures, a view that is dominant in
the theoretical literature. However, since the experiments did not allow us to directly
compare semantic responses to the candidate pragmatic ones, we will rather stick
with the conclusion that the current results are fully consistent with this view.
Experiment 2 clearly distinguishes between various implementations of the
pragmatic mechanism behind variation effects. We successfully demonstrated that
in sentences of the form all streets were guarded by { at least n / more than n−1 }
policemen, there is the specific inference that some street was guarded by exactly
n policemen. As we explained above, the existence of this inference is evidence in
favour of what we called Strategy 3 and evidence against Strategy 2.
In our description of Strategy 3, we took the simple view that modified numerals
are binary disjunctions. This is intuitively appealing for at least n which then takes
exactly n and more than n as its alternatives. In other words, the alternatives appear
to be generated from the modifier, rather than from the numeral. However, this
route is far less appealing for more than n. As we demonstrated, such modified
numerals trigger the same inferences and so, according to the same strategy, we
would need to say that more than n has the alternatives exactly n+1 and more than
n+1. Hence, the idea that modified numerals generate alternatives by substituting
the modifier only is untenable. That said, the way we described Strategy 3 above
is not the only way to get this particular set of inferences (partial variation and a
witness for the lowest number). Mayr (2013) (see also Schwarz 2013) suggests that
the alternatives for modified numerals are generated by substituting both the numeral
and the modifier, where the only alternative for at least is at most and the only
alternative for more than is fewer than. For example, at least 3 has as its alternatives:
at least 4, at least 5, at least 6, . . . , at most 3, at most 4, . . . , etc. Using this set
of alternatives in the implicature mechanism is equivalent to using the simple set
{exactly 3, more than 3}.
547
Alexandropoulou, Dotlacˇil, McNabb & Nouwen
In sum, we have presented evidence that modified numerals come with partial
variation inferences akin to those found with epistemic indefinites. These variation
effects, however, differ from those found with epistemic indefinites in that they
include the inference of a witness for the lowest number compatible with the modified
numeral.
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